We i n vestigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without communication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match e a c h others' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction game. Our earlier experiments show that in common value auctions with complete information, collusion does occur and is sustainable even when bidders cannot explicitly coordinate their strategies. In this study, w e i n vestigate the robustness of bidders' collusive behavior in private values, private information environments. We nd that collusion still occurs as long as the bidders' gains from collusion are high.
1 Introduction auction period. 1 Our earlier results indicate that in a complete information environment with a small number of bidders where all bidders have c o m m o n v aluations for the objects, such collusion does occur in the oral auctions where bid matching is allowed (Sherstyuk, 1999) . 2 The occurrence of collusion in a complete information environment with symmetric bidders may not be surprising given a large bodyof experimental evidence which indicates that, generally, symmetry and complete information helps to sustain collusion (Holt, 1995) . In this study, we relax the symmetric valuations, complete information assumption, and investigate the robustness of bidders' collusive behavior in private values, private information environments. When all bidders have identical valuations, competitive bidding invariably leads to zero pro ts to all bidders the bidders have nothing to lose by colluding. However, if objects' valuations vary across bidders and are their private information, collusion may be harder to achieve and sustain. McAfee and McMillan (1992, p. 580) note that in order to collude, the bidders must resolve their asymmetric information problem: they must have some way of selecting a winner. In a recent study of bidder collusion in multi-unit sealed bid auctions with communication, Kwasnica (1998) reports that the subjects did not use simple random assignment rules to allocate the objects, but adopted collusive mechanisms that were more likely to assign the objects to the bidders with higher values. This indicates that e ciency considerations are important to subjects in deciding on object allocations. In oral auctions where no communication is allowed, it may bedi cult for high value bidders to communicate their values to others without triggering competition. Further, the bidders' expected payo s in competitive equilibrium are no longer zero the opportunity cost of following competitive strategies is reduced as compared to the symmetric valuations case. 1 McAfee and McMillan (1992) prove that, in a single-unit sealed bid auction where transfer payments among bidders are not possible, the optimal collusion involves all bidders submitting the same (minimal) bid for the object. The important di erence is that in the oral auctions that allow for bid matching, such collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium within one auction period in the sealed bids, repeated play is necessary to sustain collusive outcomes. 2 There is empirical evidence that auction rules that allow for bid matching lead to supracompetitive pricing even if the ties in bids of equal value are not broken randomly. In Cook County (Chicago), Illinois, contracts for tax lien collection are allocated in a sealed bid auction, where the ties are broken in favor of rms who have large historical market shares. Firms in this market now f a c e a class-action antitrust lawsuit, alleging anticompetitive bidding. Another example is retail online auctions \Onsale" (http://www.onsale.com) that use the \Yankee auction" format. In a Yankee auction, one or more identical items are o ered for sale at the same time. When the auction closes, the highest bidders win the available merchandise at their bid price. Bids are ranked in order of price, then quantity, then time of initial bid. During the auction, the information about the current highest bidders and their bids is posted at the web site. Bidders can also post a comment together with their bid. Bid matching is very common in these auctions, and comments such as \Keep it cheap" are not unusual.
Below we report on the series of experiments that allow us to assess how bidders' collusive b e h a vior is a ected by the presence of private information on bidders' valuations. Further, we i n vestigate whether collusion is sensitive to the degree of asymmetry in bidder valuations, payo gains from collusion as compared to the competitive equilibrium, and subject pool training in other experimental markets.
Experimental design
To m a k e a clear comparison between the complete information, symmetric valuation case studied earlier, and the private information, private values case considered here, most of the features of the experimental design are exactly as in Sherstyuk (1999) . There are three bidders in the market and two identical objects for sale. Each bidder demands exactly one unit in a given period. The institution is the weekly ascending oral auction: each subsequent bid submitted to the market has to be no lower than the highest outstanding bid. The soft closing rule is used to end periods: the period is closed when no new bids are incoming for 30 seconds. At the end of the period, the units are allocated to the two highest bidders, provided that the bids are no lower than the seller's reservation price. Ties in the bids of acceptances, if any, are broken by random choice of buyer. 3 In the benchmark experiments conducted at Melbourne university (Sherstyuk, 1999) , all bidders had the same value of 100 experimental francs for the object, which w as common knowledge. The seller's reservation price was 5 francs and was announced at the beginning of each period. One experimental franc was equal to one Australian cent. We will refer to these experiments as the benchmark common values (C) treatment. In the present study, we consider two private values, private information treatments that di er only in the support from which the bidders private values were drawn. In the low asymmetry (PL) treatment, the values were drawn from the uniform distribution with the support of 90 100] experimental francs in the high asymmetry (PH) treatment, the support was changed to 50 100] francs. Bidder valuations and bids submitted were constrained to be integers. The seller's reservation price was 10 francs in both cases. 4 The distributions of values and the seller's reservation price were chosen so that expected payo gains from collusion relative to the competitive equilibrium were substantial in all cases. However, in the low asymmetry 90,100] treatment the gains from collusion 3 Experimental instructions are available from the author upon request. 4 The reserve price of 10, instead of 5 experimental francs, was announced by mistake in the rst experimental session, and was then replicated in each session. The di erence between 5 and 10 experimental francs was negligible.
were higher, and the expected payo s in the competitive equilibrium were lower, than in the high asymmetry 50,100] treatment. Theoretically, with 3 bidders and 2 objects, the competitive equilibrium price is equal to the lowest value drawn among the three bidders.
If the values are drawn from the uniform distribution with the support v v], then, in the competitive equilibrium, the expected payo of bidder i who has a value v i is:
If the bidders collude and all submit bids equal to the seller's reservation price p, then under the auction rules considered, each bidder has a two t h i r d s c hance of buying the unit at the minimal price. 5 The expected payo from collusion, given a value of v i , i s :
De ne the absolute expected gains from collusion as the di erence between expected payo s from the collusive and the competitive equilibrium outcomes:
Incentives to collude can be also measured by the relative expected gain from collusion which indicates the percentage gain from collusion relative to the competitive equilibrium payo :
It is straightforward to show that as long as the seller's reservation price is no higher than the lower bound of the support of bidders' valuations, the relative gains from collusion are non-negative for a l l b i d d e r t ypes, but are strictly decreasing in bidder valuations. A bidder who draws the value of v is certain to gain nothing in the competitive outcome, and therefore has strong incentives to pursue collusion. On the contrary, a bidder who draws v expects a positive gain from the competitive outcome his incentives to collude are therefore the minimal among all bidder types. Thus, we can compare the di erent treatments on the basis of gains from collusion to the bidder with the highest value. Table 1 presents such a comparison. 5 As long as the seller's reservation price is low enough, there is a continuum of collusive levels of bids which g i v e the bidders expected payo s higher than in the competitive equilibrium. We f o c u s our attention on the outcome that is payo -dominant for the bidders in this class of outcomes, in the sense that it maximizes the bidders' joint p a yo .
EP C E (100) EP C o l l (100) AG (100) The present design allows us to answer two questions of interest. First, can a small degree of asymmetry in bidder valuations break down the collusion that was observed under the common values, common information treatment? Second, how does collusive stability depend on bidders' incentives to collude, measured by t h e absolute and relative gains from collusion?
There are two additional questions that we s e e k t o a n s w er in this study. One is whether the absolute, or the relative payo gains from collusion are more important for collusion occurrence and sustainability. Observe that bothabsolute and relative gains are higher under the PL than under the PH treatment, provided that a common exchange rate is used to convert experimental francs into dollars. Thus, we might expect the PL treatment to result in more collusive outcomes due to the absolute and/or relative gains increase. However, by varying the exchange rates for dollars across treatments, we can create the high and low asymmetry treatments that have identical absolute gains from collusion in dollar terms and di er only in relative gains, and thus investigate the e ect of relative gains alone.
The other question is how bidder collusion in our experiments depends on subjects' previous training in other experimental markets. To a n s w er these questions, we used two subject pools in our experiments: Melbourne university students (Australia) and Caltech students (USA). Most Melbourne university s t u d e n ts had no prior experiences with experimental markets. Most Caltech s t u d e n ts have previously participated in a numbermarket experiments. The low and high asymmetry treatments with a common dollar exchange rates were tested on Melbourne university subjects. The design that isolated the e ect of relative gains from collusion, keeping the absolute gains constant, was implemented on Caltech subject pool.
The features of experimental design are summarized in (Sherstyuk, 1999) . Most Melbourne university subjects were rst or second year undergraduate students in economics and commerce, all recruited through posted yers or class announcements. All Caltech subjects were recruited through a web recruitment program there were both undergraduate and graduate students among the subjects. Each session was conducted with three subjects. All sessions were conducted as non-computerized experiments the subjects were seated in a classroom, behind each other, and two rows away from each other, to guarantee that they could not see each other's faces. No communication was allowed. Each session consisted of 15 identical periods, preceded by one practice period. 7 Bidders' private values were drawn for each subject at the beginning of each period by the experimenter. All bids together with bidder ID numbers were recorded on the overhead. Ties in the bids of acceptance were resolved in front of the subjects by an assistant or by one of the subjects, using cards marked with bidders' ID numbers. At the end of each experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in private, plus $5 participation fee (Australian and US dollars, respectively).
experiments for both PL and PH treatments. Thus, one could argue that incentives to collude were slightly higher at Caltech than at Melbourne under both treatments. This argument is complicated by possible di erences in subjects' opportunity costs and in purchasing power of Australian and US dollar in respective domestic markets. As will be discussed in the next section, the di erences in the exchange rates between Melbourne and Caltech experiments do not prevent us from answering the research questions of interest. 7 By a subject's request, one of Caltech sessions (PH-2) included two practice periods.
Results
We rst compare the overall performance of auctions under the various treatments, and then consider the role of bid matching is sustaining collusive outcomes.
Overall performance
The data from the four private values treatments are compared with the data from the benchmark common values experiments reported in Sherstyuk (1999) . The results pooled by treatment and subject poolare summarized in gure 1 and table 3. Since the competitive equilibrium price in a given period depends on speci c realizations of bidders' values, we cannot use the observed auction prices to compare the auction outcomes within a treatment and across treatments. We use the following measure of auction competi- 
The market competitiveness is at 0% in the collusive equilibrium, and is at 100% in the competitive equilibrium. It will exceed 100% if the units are traded at prices above the competitive equilibrium prediction v 3 . 8
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
The dynamics of average market competitiveness pooled by treatment is illustrated in gure 1. Figures 2-6 in the appendix graph the dynamics of market competitiveness in the common value auctions (benchmark) and the four treatments of the private value auctions, by session. The gures also report, for each session, the average market competitiveness and percentage of collusive-type matches in the end-of period bids (to be discussed in detail in section 3.2 below). Descriptive statistics on market competitiveness by treatment are summarized in table 3. To trace possible e ects of subjects' experience, we divided all 8 This measure is closely related to the index of monopoly efectiveness used to evaluate the performance of market insitutions (e.g., Davis and Holt, 1993, p. 134) . We use the market competitiveness measure since under our design, it closely traces, both graphically and numerically, the dynamics of auction trading prices. 10 Moreover, the competitiveness decreased from the early periods to the late periodsinallthreeof these treatments. 2
Mean
Result 2 The incidence and stability of bidder collusion was sensitive to payo gains from collusion. Collusive tendencies became less pronounced and broke down as payo gains from collusion decreased in Melbourne experiments. Collusion was sustained in Caltech experiments where absolute payo gains from collusion remained high. 9 Period 1 w as the practice period. We include it in the data analysis since it may c o n tain valuable information about the subjects' initial perceptions of the game. 10 In the t-tests, mean per experiment v alues were taken as units of observation.
Support: Figures 1-6, table 3 . For Melbourne experiments, where the C, PL and PH treatment w ere clearly ranked by both absolute and relative gains from collusion, the mean market competitiveness increased from 21.03% under the C treatment, to 56.27% under the PL treatment, to 103.43% under the PH treatment. According to the permutation test (Siegel and Castellan, 1988 , pp. 151-155), the average per experiment competitiveness was higher in the PL treatment than in the C treatment at the signi cance level of 2.9% (onetailed). The average per experiment competitiveness was higher in the PH treatment than in the PL treatment at the signi cance level of 1.4% (one-tailed). In the PH treatment, the market competitiveness exceeded the competitive equilibrium prediction of 100%. For Caltech experiments, where the absolute gains from collusion were the same under the PL and PH treatments, the hypothesis of no di erence in market competitiveness between these treatments is sustained with the p-value of 30.0% (one-tailed). 2 Result 3 Previous training in market experiments and higher monetary incentives increased bidder collusion: Overall, bidder collusion was higher in Caltech experiments than in Melbourne experiments. Support: Figure 1, table 3 . The permutation test shows that the average per experiment market competitiveness under the PL treatment w as lower for Caltech than for Melbourne with the p-value of 7.1% (one-tailed). The average market competitiveness under the PH treatment w as lower for Caltech than for Melbourne with the p-value of 1.4% (one-tailed). 2 Result 4 In Caltech experiments, the absolute gains from collusion were d e cisive for collusion occurrence and sustainability: the amount of bidder collusion was not signi cantly di erent between the PL and PH treatments.
Support: See support for result 2. Remarkably, in three out of four sessions under the PH treatment at Caltech, the payo -dominant collusive outcome was sustained in the late periods: the market competitiveness was close to 0% (table 3, gure 6). 2
To summarize, we nd that under an auction institution which allows for implicit coordination of bidder strategies, the incidence of bidder collusion strongly depends on bidders' incentives to collude, measure by payo gains from collusion. Interesting di erences in behavior are observed between an inexperienced and a well-trained subject pools (Melbourne and Caltech subjects, respectively). The dynamics of Melbourne experiments suggests that, as a rule, collusion emerged only after the subjects experienced low p a yo s at the competitive equilibrium: consider the market dynamics in the early periods under the C and the PL treatments ( gures 2 and 3). Under the PH treatment, where the competitive equilibrium payo s were non-negligible, collusive tendencies never emerged ( gure 4). This evidence suggests that for inexperienced subject pools, collusion is driven by relative, rather than absolute, payo gains. However, Caltech experiments demonstrate that more experienced subjects pursue the absolute payo gains. As it is evident from the PH treatment at Caltech, private values, high value asymmetry and non-negligible competitive equilibrium payo s were not su cient for the auctions to result in competitive outcomes.
The role of bid matching
We now turn to the role of the absence of the strict bid improvement rule in sustaining collusive outcomes. How often was bid matching used to achieve and maintain collusion? To answer this question, we classify all auction outcomes into three types. We will call an outcome collusive if the highest closing bid in the market is below the lower bound of the private values support: b 1 < v. As discussed in section 2, in such an outcome a bidder with any v alue (including the highest value of 100 francs) is at least as well o as in the competitive equilibrium, provided that he has a two thirds chance of winning the unit. We will call all other outcomes competitive. Further observe that collusive outcomes may beof only two types: (i) Collusive While collusive bid matching outcomes can be sustained as Nash equilibria within one auction period, repeated play is necessary to sustain bid rotation outcomes. Table 4 displays the percentages of auction outcomes by t ype, pooled by treatment. 11 The percentages of collusive t ype matches in the end-of-period bids (irrespective of auction outcomes) for individual sessions are reported in gures 2-6. We conclude the following. Table 4 : Frequencies of auction outcomes by t ype, % Result 5 Bid matching was the most frequently used method to achieve and sustain collusion in Melbourne and Caltech low asymmetry experiments. Both bid rotation and bid matching were used to sustain collusion in Caltech high asymmetry experiments.
Support: Table 4 , gures 2-6. 34.4% of all PL outcomes in Melbourne and 40.6% of all PL outcomes at Caltech w ere collusive outcomes which i n volved bid matches. In the late periods, these percentages increased to 53.1% and 50.0%, respectively. In Caltech PH experiments, 29.2% of outcomes were collusive bid rotation outcomes, as compared to 24.6% collusive bid matching outcomes in the late periods, the percentage of bid rotation outcomes increased to 45.5%. For individual sessions, collusive bid matching was most frequently used in three PL sessions in Melbourne (PL-1: 68.7% collusive outcomes, PL-3: 25% outcomes, PL-4: 43.8% outcomes), and three PL sessions and one PH session at Caltech (PL-1: 37.5% outcomes, PL-2: 50% outcomes, PL-4: 56.2% outcomes, PH-1: 75% outcomes). Collusive bid rotation was widely used in two PH sessions and one PL session at Caltech (PH-2: 52.9% outcomes, PH-3: 62.5% outcomes PL-3: 81.2% outcomes), and in only one PL session in Melbourne (PL-2: 37.5%). The majority (over 80% for both Melbourne and Caltech) of competitive outcomes did note involve bid matches of collusive types. 2
Arguably, in an auction where explicit communication is not allowed, bid matching is easier for bidders to adopt than bid rotation: under bid matching, the objects are allocated randomly, whereas under bid rotation, the bidders have t o n d a w ay to coordinate whose turn it is to win the objects. It is then not surprising that inexperienced Melbourne subjects overwhelmingly adopted bid matching schemes what is fascinating is the ability of Caltech subjects to adopt bid rotation schemes in some cases. 12 From the bidders' perspective, bid rotation may have various advantages over bid matching. Bid rotation eliminates uncertainty if bidders take turns in staying out, then each bidder is guaranteed to get the object in two thirds of the auctions in a session. Further, if bidders pursue e ciency and are somehow able to communicate a likely ranking of their private valuations, then bid rotation can achieve higher market e ciency than bid matching. The market e ciency is de ned as the percentage of the maximal social surplus realized in the market:
where v i and x i denote the object valuation and the assignment coe cient of bidder i (x i = 1 if bidder i wins the object, and x i = 0 otherwise), and v j denotes the j-th highest value drawn among the bidders. Under the competitive equilibrium prediction, the market e ciency is 100% under collusion, e ciency losses occur unless the bidders nd a way t o allocate the objects to the bidders with the two highest values. Consider whether, in fact, collusion resulted in e ciency losses in our experiments, and whether bid rotation outcomes were any di erent from bid matching outcomes in terms of their e ciency. Table 5 displays the theoretically predicted and experimentally observed market e ciencies by treatment and by type of outcome. 13 Interestingly, we nd that e ciency losses under collusion were minimal and below the theoretical predictions. Result 6 Overall, there were no e ciency losses due to collusion in either Melbourne or Caltech experiments. The average market e ciency under collusive outcomes was no di erent than under competitive outcomes. The e ciency of collusive outcomes under the PH treatment at Caltech was higher than theoretically predicted. The di erences in e ciencies between the bid matching and bid rotation outcomes were minimal. 12 Coordination problems may be easier to overcome if subjects in the same session knew each other. We did not allow a n y sessions in which all three subjects were aquainted with each other. In both Melbourne and Caltech experiments, there were some sessions where two subjects knew each other the number of such sessions was about the same at Melbourne and Caltech. 13 The theoretical predictions for bid rotation outcomes given in table 5 were obtained assuming that the objects are allocated to bidders in turn and independently of their private valuations. The predicted e ciencies are therefore identical for the bid rotation and bid matching collusive outcomes. The estimates of the e ciencies of collusive outcomes were obtained through computer simulations. Table 5 . In the PL treatments at both Melbourne and Caltech, the average market e ciencies under competitive outcomes were no higher than under either collusive bid matching or bid rotation outcomes. In the PH experiments at Caltech, the average market e ciencies under collusive and bid matching outcomes were 94.57% and 96.57%, respectively, as compared to 96.94% for competitive outcomes, and the theoretical prediction of 91.32% for collusive outcomes. 2 
Discussion
The above results provide interesting insight into the nature and stability of bidder collusion in oral auctions with a small numberof bidders. We conclude that it is not the complete information and symmetry as such that is necessary for the emergence and sustainability o f collusion. Rather, it is the bidders' common knowledge of potentially high gains from collusion. Under the private values treatments where the gains from collusion were high, collusive tendencies did emerge and increase with bidders' experience it is evident from gures 2, 3, 5 and 6 that the dynamics of the private values, high payo gains experiments (PL experiments at Melbourne and both PL and PH experiments at Caltech) were quite similar to the common values experiments. On the other hand, we observe that decreasing gains from collusion contribute to the breakdown of collusive tendencies. In the PH experiments at Melbourne, where the expected payo s from collusion were twice as low as under the PL treatment, we observed no incidence of collusion.
We have obtained a strong experimental evidence that the absence of the strict improvement rule in ascending price oral auctions can be very favorable for bidder collusion and equally detrimental for auctioneer's revenue. Bid matching was the most widely used collusive method that was easily adopted by both inexperienced and well-trained subjects. Interestingly, h o wever, we found that bidder collusion did not a ect the market e ciency in our experiments to the extent predicted by the theory.
We found that the subjects' ability to achieve and sustain collusion increased with their previous training in other experimental markets. Caltech experiments resulted in higher bidder collusion than Melbourne experiments, and Caltech subjects were able to adopt a broader variety of collusive schemes than Melbourne subjects. This suggests that although the absence of the bid improvement rule signi cantly facilitates bidder collusion, one could expect well-trained bidders to engage in tacit collusion even under less \favorable" institutional arrangements (see also footnote 2 in section 1). Investigation of other institutional features that help to safeguard against bidder collusion in ascending auctions with a small number of bidders would constitute an interesting topic for further research. 
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